X-Git-Url: https://www.tinc-vpn.org/git/browse?p=tinc;a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fsptps.c;h=93a7ad3ff1e9037d9846ecbd56dfae66813589e5;hp=2d02b6677b50bd7c5730df33297a79982aaa218c;hb=f6e87ab476a0faf8b124ecaaa27f967d825e6457;hpb=3a316823b971396a428f020f401b9fe41252d98d diff --git a/src/sptps.c b/src/sptps.c index 2d02b667..93a7ad3f 100644 --- a/src/sptps.c +++ b/src/sptps.c @@ -103,8 +103,9 @@ static bool send_record_priv_datagram(sptps_t *s, uint8_t type, const void *data } // Send a record (private version, accepts all record types, handles encryption and authentication). static bool send_record_priv(sptps_t *s, uint8_t type, const void *data, uint16_t len) { - if(s->datagram) + if(s->datagram) { return send_record_priv_datagram(s, type, data, len); + } char buffer[len + 19UL]; @@ -130,11 +131,13 @@ static bool send_record_priv(sptps_t *s, uint8_t type, const void *data, uint16_ bool sptps_send_record(sptps_t *s, uint8_t type, const void *data, uint16_t len) { // Sanity checks: application cannot send data before handshake is finished, // and only record types 0..127 are allowed. - if(!s->outstate) + if(!s->outstate) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Handshake phase not finished yet"); + } - if(type >= SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) + if(type >= SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Invalid application record type"); + } return send_record_priv(s, type, data, len); } @@ -144,11 +147,15 @@ static bool send_kex(sptps_t *s) { size_t keylen = ECDH_SIZE; // Make room for our KEX message, which we will keep around since send_sig() needs it. - if(s->mykex) + if(s->mykex) { return false; + } + s->mykex = realloc(s->mykex, 1 + 32 + keylen); - if(!s->mykex) + + if(!s->mykex) { return error(s, errno, strerror(errno)); + } // Set version byte to zero. s->mykex[0] = SPTPS_VERSION; @@ -157,8 +164,9 @@ static bool send_kex(sptps_t *s) { randomize(s->mykex + 1, 32); // Create a new ECDH public key. - if(!(s->ecdh = ecdh_generate_public(s->mykex + 1 + 32))) + if(!(s->ecdh = ecdh_generate_public(s->mykex + 1 + 32))) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to generate ECDH public key"); + } return send_record_priv(s, SPTPS_HANDSHAKE, s->mykex, 1 + 32 + keylen); } @@ -178,8 +186,9 @@ static bool send_sig(sptps_t *s) { memcpy(msg + 1 + 2 * (33 + keylen), s->label, s->labellen); // Sign the result. - if(!ecdsa_sign(s->mykey, msg, sizeof(msg), sig)) + if(!ecdsa_sign(s->mykey, msg, sizeof(msg), sig)) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to sign SIG record"); + } // Send the SIG exchange record. return send_record_priv(s, SPTPS_HANDSHAKE, sig, sizeof(sig)); @@ -191,20 +200,25 @@ static bool generate_key_material(sptps_t *s, const char *shared, size_t len) { if(!s->outstate) { s->incipher = chacha_poly1305_init(); s->outcipher = chacha_poly1305_init(); - if(!s->incipher || !s->outcipher) + + if(!s->incipher || !s->outcipher) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to open cipher"); + } } // Allocate memory for key material size_t keylen = 2 * CHACHA_POLY1305_KEYLEN; s->key = realloc(s->key, keylen); - if(!s->key) + + if(!s->key) { return error(s, errno, strerror(errno)); + } // Create the HMAC seed, which is "key expansion" + session label + server nonce + client nonce char seed[s->labellen + 64 + 13]; memcpy(seed, "key expansion", 13); + if(s->initiator) { memcpy(seed + 13, s->mykex + 1, 32); memcpy(seed + 45, s->hiskex + 1, 32); @@ -212,11 +226,13 @@ static bool generate_key_material(sptps_t *s, const char *shared, size_t len) { memcpy(seed + 13, s->hiskex + 1, 32); memcpy(seed + 45, s->mykex + 1, 32); } + memcpy(seed + 77, s->label, s->labellen); // Use PRF to generate the key material - if(!prf(shared, len, seed, s->labellen + 64 + 13, s->key, keylen)) + if(!prf(shared, len, seed, s->labellen + 64 + 13, s->key, keylen)) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to generate key material"); + } return true; } @@ -228,15 +244,18 @@ static bool send_ack(sptps_t *s) { // Receive an ACKnowledgement record. static bool receive_ack(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) { - if(len) + if(len) { return error(s, EIO, "Invalid ACK record length"); + } if(s->initiator) { - if(!chacha_poly1305_set_key(s->incipher, s->key)) + if(!chacha_poly1305_set_key(s->incipher, s->key)) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to set counter"); + } } else { - if(!chacha_poly1305_set_key(s->incipher, s->key + CHACHA_POLY1305_KEYLEN)) + if(!chacha_poly1305_set_key(s->incipher, s->key + CHACHA_POLY1305_KEYLEN)) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to set counter"); + } } free(s->key); @@ -249,17 +268,22 @@ static bool receive_ack(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) { // Receive a Key EXchange record, respond by sending a SIG record. static bool receive_kex(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) { // Verify length of the HELLO record - if(len != 1 + 32 + ECDH_SIZE) + if(len != 1 + 32 + ECDH_SIZE) { return error(s, EIO, "Invalid KEX record length"); + } // Ignore version number for now. // Make a copy of the KEX message, send_sig() and receive_sig() need it - if(s->hiskex) + if(s->hiskex) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Received a second KEX message before first has been processed"); + } + s->hiskex = realloc(s->hiskex, len); - if(!s->hiskex) + + if(!s->hiskex) { return error(s, errno, strerror(errno)); + } memcpy(s->hiskex, data, len); @@ -272,8 +296,9 @@ static bool receive_sig(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) { size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(s->hiskey); // Verify length of KEX record. - if(len != siglen) + if(len != siglen) { return error(s, EIO, "Invalid KEX record length"); + } // Concatenate both KEX messages, plus tag indicating if it is from the connection originator char msg[(1 + 32 + keylen) * 2 + 1 + s->labellen]; @@ -284,18 +309,23 @@ static bool receive_sig(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) { memcpy(msg + 1 + 2 * (33 + keylen), s->label, s->labellen); // Verify signature. - if(!ecdsa_verify(s->hiskey, msg, sizeof(msg), data)) + if(!ecdsa_verify(s->hiskey, msg, sizeof(msg), data)) { return error(s, EIO, "Failed to verify SIG record"); + } // Compute shared secret. char shared[ECDH_SHARED_SIZE]; - if(!ecdh_compute_shared(s->ecdh, s->hiskex + 1 + 32, shared)) + + if(!ecdh_compute_shared(s->ecdh, s->hiskex + 1 + 32, shared)) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to compute ECDH shared secret"); + } + s->ecdh = NULL; // Generate key material from shared secret. - if(!generate_key_material(s, shared, sizeof(shared))) + if(!generate_key_material(s, shared, sizeof(shared))) { return false; + } free(s->mykex); free(s->hiskex); @@ -304,16 +334,19 @@ static bool receive_sig(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) { s->hiskex = NULL; // Send cipher change record - if(s->outstate && !send_ack(s)) + if(s->outstate && !send_ack(s)) { return false; + } // TODO: only set new keys after ACK has been set/received if(s->initiator) { - if(!chacha_poly1305_set_key(s->outcipher, s->key + CHACHA_POLY1305_KEYLEN)) + if(!chacha_poly1305_set_key(s->outcipher, s->key + CHACHA_POLY1305_KEYLEN)) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to set key"); + } } else { - if(!chacha_poly1305_set_key(s->outcipher, s->key)) + if(!chacha_poly1305_set_key(s->outcipher, s->key)) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to set key"); + } } return true; @@ -321,8 +354,9 @@ static bool receive_sig(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) { // Force another Key EXchange (for testing purposes). bool sptps_force_kex(sptps_t *s) { - if(!s->outstate || s->state != SPTPS_SECONDARY_KEX) + if(!s->outstate || s->state != SPTPS_SECONDARY_KEX) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Cannot force KEX in current state"); + } s->state = SPTPS_KEX; return send_kex(s); @@ -332,41 +366,59 @@ bool sptps_force_kex(sptps_t *s) { static bool receive_handshake(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) { // Only a few states to deal with handshaking. switch(s->state) { - case SPTPS_SECONDARY_KEX: - // We receive a secondary KEX request, first respond by sending our own. - if(!send_kex(s)) - return false; - case SPTPS_KEX: - // We have sent our KEX request, we expect our peer to sent one as well. - if(!receive_kex(s, data, len)) - return false; - s->state = SPTPS_SIG; - return true; - case SPTPS_SIG: - // If we already sent our secondary public ECDH key, we expect the peer to send his. - if(!receive_sig(s, data, len)) + case SPTPS_SECONDARY_KEX: + + // We receive a secondary KEX request, first respond by sending our own. + if(!send_kex(s)) { + return false; + } + + case SPTPS_KEX: + + // We have sent our KEX request, we expect our peer to sent one as well. + if(!receive_kex(s, data, len)) { + return false; + } + + s->state = SPTPS_SIG; + return true; + + case SPTPS_SIG: + + // If we already sent our secondary public ECDH key, we expect the peer to send his. + if(!receive_sig(s, data, len)) { + return false; + } + + if(s->outstate) { + s->state = SPTPS_ACK; + } else { + s->outstate = true; + + if(!receive_ack(s, NULL, 0)) { return false; - if(s->outstate) - s->state = SPTPS_ACK; - else { - s->outstate = true; - if(!receive_ack(s, NULL, 0)) - return false; - s->receive_record(s->handle, SPTPS_HANDSHAKE, NULL, 0); - s->state = SPTPS_SECONDARY_KEX; } - return true; - case SPTPS_ACK: - // We expect a handshake message to indicate transition to the new keys. - if(!receive_ack(s, data, len)) - return false; s->receive_record(s->handle, SPTPS_HANDSHAKE, NULL, 0); s->state = SPTPS_SECONDARY_KEX; - return true; - // TODO: split ACK into a VERify and ACK? - default: - return error(s, EIO, "Invalid session state %d", s->state); + } + + return true; + + case SPTPS_ACK: + + // We expect a handshake message to indicate transition to the new keys. + if(!receive_ack(s, data, len)) { + return false; + } + + s->receive_record(s->handle, SPTPS_HANDSHAKE, NULL, 0); + s->state = SPTPS_SECONDARY_KEX; + return true; + + // TODO: split ACK into a VERify and ACK? + default: + return error(s, EIO, "Invalid session state %d", s->state); } } @@ -381,44 +433,54 @@ static bool sptps_check_seqno(sptps_t *s, uint32_t seqno, bool update_state) { if(seqno >= s->inseqno + s->replaywin * 8) { // Prevent packets that jump far ahead of the queue from causing many others to be dropped. bool farfuture = s->farfuture < s->replaywin >> 2; - if (update_state) + + if(update_state) { s->farfuture++; - if(farfuture) + } + + if(farfuture) { return update_state ? error(s, EIO, "Packet is %d seqs in the future, dropped (%u)\n", seqno - s->inseqno, s->farfuture) : false; + } // Unless we have seen lots of them, in which case we consider the others lost. - if(update_state) + if(update_state) { warning(s, "Lost %d packets\n", seqno - s->inseqno); - if (update_state) { + } + + if(update_state) { // Mark all packets in the replay window as being late. memset(s->late, 255, s->replaywin); } - } else if (seqno < s->inseqno) { + } else if(seqno < s->inseqno) { // If the sequence number is farther in the past than the bitmap goes, or if the packet was already received, drop it. - if((s->inseqno >= s->replaywin * 8 && seqno < s->inseqno - s->replaywin * 8) || !(s->late[(seqno / 8) % s->replaywin] & (1 << seqno % 8))) + if((s->inseqno >= s->replaywin * 8 && seqno < s->inseqno - s->replaywin * 8) || !(s->late[(seqno / 8) % s->replaywin] & (1 << seqno % 8))) { return update_state ? error(s, EIO, "Received late or replayed packet, seqno %d, last received %d\n", seqno, s->inseqno) : false; - } else if (update_state) { + } + } else if(update_state) { // We missed some packets. Mark them in the bitmap as being late. - for(int i = s->inseqno; i < seqno; i++) + for(int i = s->inseqno; i < seqno; i++) { s->late[(i / 8) % s->replaywin] |= 1 << i % 8; + } } } - if (update_state) { + if(update_state) { // Mark the current packet as not being late. s->late[(seqno / 8) % s->replaywin] &= ~(1 << seqno % 8); s->farfuture = 0; } } - if (update_state) { - if(seqno >= s->inseqno) + if(update_state) { + if(seqno >= s->inseqno) { s->inseqno = seqno + 1; + } - if(!s->inseqno) + if(!s->inseqno) { s->received = 0; - else + } else { s->received++; + } } return true; @@ -426,14 +488,17 @@ static bool sptps_check_seqno(sptps_t *s, uint32_t seqno, bool update_state) { // Check datagram for valid HMAC bool sptps_verify_datagram(sptps_t *s, const void *data, size_t len) { - if(!s->instate || len < 21) + if(!s->instate || len < 21) { return error(s, EIO, "Received short packet"); + } uint32_t seqno; memcpy(&seqno, data, 4); seqno = ntohl(seqno); - if (!sptps_check_seqno(s, seqno, false)) + + if(!sptps_check_seqno(s, seqno, false)) { return false; + } char buffer[len]; size_t outlen; @@ -442,24 +507,29 @@ bool sptps_verify_datagram(sptps_t *s, const void *data, size_t len) { // Receive incoming data, datagram version. static bool sptps_receive_data_datagram(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len) { - if(len < (s->instate ? 21 : 5)) + if(len < (s->instate ? 21 : 5)) { return error(s, EIO, "Received short packet"); + } uint32_t seqno; memcpy(&seqno, data, 4); seqno = ntohl(seqno); - data += 4; len -= 4; + data += 4; + len -= 4; if(!s->instate) { - if(seqno != s->inseqno) + if(seqno != s->inseqno) { return error(s, EIO, "Invalid packet seqno: %d != %d", seqno, s->inseqno); + } s->inseqno = seqno + 1; - uint8_t type = *(data++); len--; + uint8_t type = *(data++); + len--; - if(type != SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) + if(type != SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) { return error(s, EIO, "Application record received before handshake finished"); + } return receive_handshake(s, data, len); } @@ -468,11 +538,14 @@ static bool sptps_receive_data_datagram(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len char buffer[len]; size_t outlen; - if(!chacha_poly1305_decrypt(s->incipher, seqno, data, len, buffer, &outlen)) + + if(!chacha_poly1305_decrypt(s->incipher, seqno, data, len, buffer, &outlen)) { return error(s, EIO, "Failed to decrypt and verify packet"); + } - if(!sptps_check_seqno(s, seqno, true)) + if(!sptps_check_seqno(s, seqno, true)) { return false; + } // Append a NULL byte for safety. buffer[outlen] = 0; @@ -480,16 +553,21 @@ static bool sptps_receive_data_datagram(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len data = buffer; len = outlen; - uint8_t type = *(data++); len--; + uint8_t type = *(data++); + len--; if(type < SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) { - if(!s->instate) + if(!s->instate) { return error(s, EIO, "Application record received before handshake finished"); - if(!s->receive_record(s->handle, type, data, len)) + } + + if(!s->receive_record(s->handle, type, data, len)) { return false; + } } else if(type == SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) { - if(!receive_handshake(s, data, len)) + if(!receive_handshake(s, data, len)) { return false; + } } else { return error(s, EIO, "Invalid record type %d", type); } @@ -501,17 +579,21 @@ static bool sptps_receive_data_datagram(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len size_t sptps_receive_data(sptps_t *s, const void *data, size_t len) { size_t total_read = 0; - if(!s->state) + if(!s->state) { return error(s, EIO, "Invalid session state zero"); + } - if(s->datagram) + if(s->datagram) { return sptps_receive_data_datagram(s, data, len) ? len : false; + } // First read the 2 length bytes. if(s->buflen < 2) { size_t toread = 2 - s->buflen; - if(toread > len) + + if(toread > len) { toread = len; + } memcpy(s->inbuf + s->buflen, data, toread); @@ -521,8 +603,9 @@ size_t sptps_receive_data(sptps_t *s, const void *data, size_t len) { data += toread; // Exit early if we don't have the full length. - if(s->buflen < 2) + if(s->buflen < 2) { return total_read; + } // Get the length bytes @@ -531,26 +614,32 @@ size_t sptps_receive_data(sptps_t *s, const void *data, size_t len) { // If we have the length bytes, ensure our buffer can hold the whole request. s->inbuf = realloc(s->inbuf, s->reclen + 19UL); - if(!s->inbuf) + + if(!s->inbuf) { return error(s, errno, strerror(errno)); + } // Exit early if we have no more data to process. - if(!len) + if(!len) { return total_read; + } } // Read up to the end of the record. size_t toread = s->reclen + (s->instate ? 19UL : 3UL) - s->buflen; - if(toread > len) + + if(toread > len) { toread = len; + } memcpy(s->inbuf + s->buflen, data, toread); total_read += toread; s->buflen += toread; // If we don't have a whole record, exit. - if(s->buflen < s->reclen + (s->instate ? 19UL : 3UL)) + if(s->buflen < s->reclen + (s->instate ? 19UL : 3UL)) { return total_read; + } // Update sequence number. @@ -558,8 +647,9 @@ size_t sptps_receive_data(sptps_t *s, const void *data, size_t len) { // Check HMAC and decrypt. if(s->instate) { - if(!chacha_poly1305_decrypt(s->incipher, seqno, s->inbuf + 2UL, s->reclen + 17UL, s->inbuf + 2UL, NULL)) + if(!chacha_poly1305_decrypt(s->incipher, seqno, s->inbuf + 2UL, s->reclen + 17UL, s->inbuf + 2UL, NULL)) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to decrypt and verify record"); + } } // Append a NULL byte for safety. @@ -568,13 +658,17 @@ size_t sptps_receive_data(sptps_t *s, const void *data, size_t len) { uint8_t type = s->inbuf[2]; if(type < SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) { - if(!s->instate) + if(!s->instate) { return error(s, EIO, "Application record received before handshake finished"); - if(!s->receive_record(s->handle, type, s->inbuf + 3, s->reclen)) + } + + if(!s->receive_record(s->handle, type, s->inbuf + 3, s->reclen)) { return false; + } } else if(type == SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) { - if(!receive_handshake(s, s->inbuf + 3, s->reclen)) + if(!receive_handshake(s, s->inbuf + 3, s->reclen)) { return false; + } } else { return error(s, EIO, "Invalid record type %d", type); } @@ -595,21 +689,30 @@ bool sptps_start(sptps_t *s, void *handle, bool initiator, bool datagram, ecdsa_ s->mykey = mykey; s->hiskey = hiskey; s->replaywin = sptps_replaywin; + if(s->replaywin) { s->late = malloc(s->replaywin); - if(!s->late) + + if(!s->late) { return error(s, errno, strerror(errno)); + } + memset(s->late, 0, s->replaywin); } s->label = malloc(labellen); - if(!s->label) + + if(!s->label) { return error(s, errno, strerror(errno)); + } if(!datagram) { s->inbuf = malloc(7); - if(!s->inbuf) + + if(!s->inbuf) { return error(s, errno, strerror(errno)); + } + s->buflen = 0; }