Use conditional compilation for cryptographic functions.

[tinc] / src / protocol_key.c

diff --git a/src/protocol_key.c b/src/protocol_key.c
index 57377b2..7f6e165 100644 (file)
--- a/src/protocol_key.c
+++ b/src/protocol_key.c
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ bool send_req_key(node_t *to) {
 static bool req_key_ext_h(connection_t *c, const char *request, node_t *from, int reqno) {
        switch(reqno) {
                case REQ_PUBKEY: {
-                       char *pubkey = ecdsa_get_base64_public_key(&myself->connection->ecdsa);
+                       char *pubkey = ecdsa_get_base64_public_key(myself->connection->ecdsa);
                        send_request(from->nexthop->connection, "%d %s %s %d %s", REQ_KEY, myself->name, from->name, ANS_PUBKEY, pubkey);
                        free(pubkey);
                        return true;
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static bool req_key_ext_h(connection_t *c, const char *request, node_t *from, in
                        }
 
                        char pubkey[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
-                       if(sscanf(request, "%*d %*s %*s %*d " MAX_STRING, pubkey) != 1 || !ecdsa_set_base64_public_key(&from->ecdsa, pubkey)) {
+                       if(sscanf(request, "%*d %*s %*s %*d " MAX_STRING, pubkey) != 1 || !(from->ecdsa = ecdsa_set_base64_public_key(pubkey))) {
                                logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s): %s", "ANS_PUBKEY", from->name, from->hostname, "invalid pubkey");
                                return true;
                        }
@@ -259,19 +259,22 @@ bool send_ans_key(node_t *to) {
        if(to->status.sptps)
                abort();
 
-       size_t keylen = cipher_keylength(&myself->incipher);
+       size_t keylen = cipher_keylength(myself->incipher);
        char key[keylen * 2 + 1];
 
-       cipher_close(&to->incipher);
-       digest_close(&to->indigest);
+       cipher_close(to->incipher);
+       digest_close(to->indigest);
 
-       cipher_open_by_nid(&to->incipher, cipher_get_nid(&myself->incipher));
-       digest_open_by_nid(&to->indigest, digest_get_nid(&myself->indigest), digest_length(&myself->indigest));
+       to->incipher = cipher_open_by_nid(cipher_get_nid(myself->incipher));
+       to->indigest = digest_open_by_nid(digest_get_nid(myself->indigest), digest_length(myself->indigest));
        to->incompression = myself->incompression;
 
+       if(!to->incipher || !to->indigest)
+               abort();
+
        randomize(key, keylen);
-       cipher_set_key(&to->incipher, key, false);
-       digest_set_key(&to->indigest, key, keylen);
+       cipher_set_key(to->incipher, key, false);
+       digest_set_key(to->indigest, key, keylen);
 
        bin2hex(key, key, keylen);
 
@@ -283,9 +286,9 @@ bool send_ans_key(node_t *to) {
 
        return send_request(to->nexthop->connection, "%d %s %s %s %d %d %d %d", ANS_KEY,
                                                myself->name, to->name, key,
-                                               cipher_get_nid(&to->incipher),
-                                               digest_get_nid(&to->indigest),
-                                               (int)digest_length(&to->indigest),
+                                               cipher_get_nid(to->incipher),
+                                               digest_get_nid(to->indigest),
+                                               (int)digest_length(to->indigest),
                                                to->incompression);
 }
 
@@ -353,8 +356,8 @@ bool ans_key_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
        }
 
        /* Don't use key material until every check has passed. */
-       cipher_close(&from->outcipher);
-       digest_close(&from->outdigest);
+       cipher_close(from->outcipher);
+       digest_close(from->outdigest);
        from->status.validkey = false;
 
        if(compression < 0 || compression > 11) {
@@ -389,17 +392,17 @@ bool ans_key_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
 
        /* Check and lookup cipher and digest algorithms */
 
-       if(!cipher_open_by_nid(&from->outcipher, cipher)) {
+       if(!(from->outcipher = cipher_open_by_nid(cipher))) {
                logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Node %s (%s) uses unknown cipher!", from->name, from->hostname);
                return false;
        }
 
-       if(!digest_open_by_nid(&from->outdigest, digest, maclength)) {
+       if(!(from->outdigest = digest_open_by_nid(digest, maclength))) {
                logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Node %s (%s) uses unknown digest!", from->name, from->hostname);
                return false;
        }
 
-       if(maclength != digest_length(&from->outdigest)) {
+       if(maclength != digest_length(from->outdigest)) {
                logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Node %s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!", from->name, from->hostname);
                return false;
        }
@@ -408,15 +411,15 @@ bool ans_key_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
 
        keylen = hex2bin(key, key, sizeof key);
 
-       if(keylen != cipher_keylength(&from->outcipher)) {
+       if(keylen != cipher_keylength(from->outcipher)) {
                logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Node %s (%s) uses wrong keylength!", from->name, from->hostname);
                return true;
        }
 
        /* Update our copy of the origin's packet key */
 
-       cipher_set_key(&from->outcipher, key, true);
-       digest_set_key(&from->outdigest, key, keylen);
+       cipher_set_key(from->outcipher, key, true);
+       digest_set_key(from->outdigest, key, keylen);
 
        from->status.validkey = true;
        from->sent_seqno = 0;