Update copyright information.

[tinc] / src / protocol_auth.c

diff --git a/src/protocol_auth.c b/src/protocol_auth.c
index c44c6d0..c806d7a 100644 (file)
--- a/src/protocol_auth.c
+++ b/src/protocol_auth.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
     protocol_auth.c -- handle the meta-protocol, authentication
-    Copyright (C) 1999-2005 Ivo Timmermans <ivo@tinc-vpn.org>,
-                  2000-2005 Guus Sliepen <guus@tinc-vpn.org>
+    Copyright (C) 1999-2005 Ivo Timmermans,
+                  2000-2008 Guus Sliepen <guus@tinc-vpn.org>
 
     This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
     it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -68,9 +68,9 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c)
                return false;
        }
 
-       /* If we set c->name in advance, make sure we are connected to the right host */
+       /* If this is an outgoing connection, make sure we are connected to the right host */
 
-       if(c->name) {
+       if(c->outgoing) {
                if(strcmp(c->name, name)) {
                        logger(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s is %s instead of %s"), c->hostname, name,
                                   c->name);
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c)
        cp();
        /* Copy random data to the buffer */
 
-       RAND_pseudo_bytes(c->outkey, len);
+       RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)c->outkey, len);
 
        /* The message we send must be smaller than the modulus of the RSA key.
           By definition, for a key of k bits, the following formula holds:
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c)
           with a length equal to that of the modulus of the RSA key.
         */
 
-       if(RSA_public_encrypt(len, c->outkey, buffer, c->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) {
+       if(RSA_public_encrypt(len, (unsigned char *)c->outkey, (unsigned char *)buffer, c->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) {
                logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"),
                           c->name, c->hostname);
                return false;
@@ -188,8 +188,8 @@ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c)
 
        if(c->outcipher) {
                if(!EVP_EncryptInit(c->outctx, c->outcipher,
-                                       c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len,
-                                       c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len -
+                                       (unsigned char *)c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len,
+                                       (unsigned char *)c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len -
                                        c->outcipher->iv_len)) {
                        logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during initialisation of cipher for %s (%s): %s"),
                                        c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
@@ -239,8 +239,8 @@ bool metakey_h(connection_t *c)
 
        /* Decrypt the meta key */
 
-       if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, buffer, c->inkey, myself->connection->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) {    /* See challenge() */
-               logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"),
+       if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, (unsigned char *)buffer, (unsigned char *)c->inkey, myself->connection->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) {  /* See challenge() */
+               logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during decryption of meta key for %s (%s)"),
                           c->name, c->hostname);
                return false;
        }
@@ -264,8 +264,8 @@ bool metakey_h(connection_t *c)
                }
 
                if(!EVP_DecryptInit(c->inctx, c->incipher,
-                                       c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len,
-                                       c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len -
+                                       (unsigned char *)c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len,
+                                       (unsigned char *)c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len -
                                        c->incipher->iv_len)) {
                        logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during initialisation of cipher from %s (%s): %s"),
                                        c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ bool send_challenge(connection_t *c)
 
        /* Copy random data to the buffer */
 
-       RAND_pseudo_bytes(c->hischallenge, len);
+       RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)c->hischallenge, len);
 
        /* Convert to hex */
 
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ bool send_chal_reply(connection_t *c)
 
        if(!EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->indigest)
                        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->mychallenge, RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key))
-                       || !EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, hash, NULL)) {
+                       || !EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, (unsigned char *)hash, NULL)) {
                logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during calculation of response for %s (%s): %s"),
                        c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
                return false;
@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c)
 
        if(!EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->outdigest)
                        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->hischallenge, RSA_size(c->rsa_key))
-                       || !EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, myhash, NULL)) {
+                       || !EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, (unsigned char *)myhash, NULL)) {
                logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during calculation of response from %s (%s): %s"),
                        c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
                return false;