Disable PMTU discovery when TCPOnly is used.
[tinc] / src / protocol_auth.c
index cde7ead..6d1435b 100644 (file)
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
     protocol_auth.c -- handle the meta-protocol, authentication
     Copyright (C) 1999-2005 Ivo Timmermans,
-                  2000-2010 Guus Sliepen <guus@tinc-vpn.org>
+                  2000-2016 Guus Sliepen <guus@tinc-vpn.org>
 
     This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
     it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
 #include "edge.h"
 #include "graph.h"
 #include "logger.h"
+#include "meta.h"
 #include "net.h"
 #include "netutl.h"
 #include "node.h"
 #include "protocol.h"
+#include "proxy.h"
 #include "utils.h"
 #include "xalloc.h"
 
 bool send_id(connection_t *c) {
+       if(proxytype && c->outgoing && !c->status.proxy_passed) {
+               return send_proxyrequest(c);
+       }
+
        return send_request(c, "%d %s %d", ID, myself->connection->name,
-                                               myself->connection->protocol_version);
+                           myself->connection->protocol_version);
 }
 
 bool id_h(connection_t *c) {
@@ -48,7 +54,7 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c) {
 
        if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d", name, &c->protocol_version) != 2) {
                logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ID", c->name,
-                          c->hostname);
+                      c->hostname);
                return false;
        }
 
@@ -56,7 +62,7 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c) {
 
        if(!check_id(name)) {
                logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s): %s", "ID", c->name,
-                          c->hostname, "invalid name");
+                      c->hostname, "invalid name");
                return false;
        }
 
@@ -65,12 +71,14 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c) {
        if(c->outgoing) {
                if(strcmp(c->name, name)) {
                        logger(LOG_ERR, "Peer %s is %s instead of %s", c->hostname, name,
-                                  c->name);
+                              c->name);
                        return false;
                }
        } else {
-               if(c->name)
+               if(c->name) {
                        free(c->name);
+               }
+
                c->name = xstrdup(name);
        }
 
@@ -78,13 +86,15 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c) {
 
        if(c->protocol_version != myself->connection->protocol_version) {
                logger(LOG_ERR, "Peer %s (%s) uses incompatible version %d",
-                          c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_version);
+                      c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_version);
                return false;
        }
 
        if(bypass_security) {
-               if(!c->config_tree)
+               if(!c->config_tree) {
                        init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
+               }
+
                c->allow_request = ACK;
                return send_ack(c);
        }
@@ -94,7 +104,7 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c) {
 
                if(!read_connection_config(c)) {
                        logger(LOG_ERR, "Peer %s had unknown identity (%s)", c->hostname,
-                                  c->name);
+                              c->name);
                        return false;
                }
        }
@@ -108,6 +118,21 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c) {
        return send_metakey(c);
 }
 
+static uint64_t byte_budget(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) {
+       /* Hopefully some failsafe way to calculate the maximum amount of bytes to
+          send/receive with a given cipher before we might run into birthday paradox
+          attacks. Because we might use different modes, the block size of the mode
+          might be 1 byte. In that case, use the IV length. Ensure the whole thing
+          is limited to what can be represented with a 64 bits integer.
+        */
+
+       int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
+       int blklen = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(cipher);
+       int len = blklen > 1 ? blklen : ivlen > 1 ? ivlen : 8;
+       int bits = len * 4 - 1;
+       return bits < 64 ? UINT64_C(1) << bits : UINT64_MAX;
+}
+
 bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
        bool x;
 
@@ -116,15 +141,25 @@ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
        /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
 
        char buffer[2 * len + 1];
-       
+
        c->outkey = xrealloc(c->outkey, len);
 
-       if(!c->outctx)
-               c->outctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->outctx));
+       if(!c->outctx) {
+               c->outctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+
+               if(!c->outctx) {
+                       abort();
+               }
+       }
 
        /* Copy random data to the buffer */
 
-       RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)c->outkey, len);
+       if(1 != RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)c->outkey, len)) {
+               int err = ERR_get_error();
+               logger(LOG_ERR, "Failed to generate meta key (%s)", ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
+               return false;
+       }
+
 
        /* The message we send must be smaller than the modulus of the RSA key.
           By definition, for a key of k bits, the following formula holds:
@@ -142,7 +177,7 @@ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
                bin2hex(c->outkey, buffer, len);
                buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
                logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s",
-                          buffer);
+                      buffer);
        }
 
        /* Encrypt the random data
@@ -153,8 +188,8 @@ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
         */
 
        if(RSA_public_encrypt(len, (unsigned char *)c->outkey, (unsigned char *)buffer, c->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) {
-               logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)",
-                          c->name, c->hostname);
+               logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s): %s",
+                      c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
                return false;
        }
 
@@ -166,22 +201,23 @@ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
        /* Send the meta key */
 
        x = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY,
-                                        c->outcipher ? c->outcipher->nid : 0,
-                                        c->outdigest ? c->outdigest->type : 0, c->outmaclength,
-                                        c->outcompression, buffer);
+                        c->outcipher ? EVP_CIPHER_nid(c->outcipher) : 0,
+                        c->outdigest ? EVP_MD_type(c->outdigest) : 0, c->outmaclength,
+                        c->outcompression, buffer);
 
        /* Further outgoing requests are encrypted with the key we just generated */
 
        if(c->outcipher) {
                if(!EVP_EncryptInit(c->outctx, c->outcipher,
-                                       (unsigned char *)c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len,
-                                       (unsigned char *)c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len -
-                                       c->outcipher->iv_len)) {
+                                   (unsigned char *)c->outkey + len - EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c->outcipher),
+                                   (unsigned char *)c->outkey + len - EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c->outcipher) -
+                                   EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c->outcipher))) {
                        logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of cipher for %s (%s): %s",
-                                       c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+                              c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
                        return false;
                }
 
+               c->outbudget = byte_budget(c->outcipher);
                c->status.encryptout = true;
        }
 
@@ -195,7 +231,7 @@ bool metakey_h(connection_t *c) {
 
        if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d %d %d %d %d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, buffer) != 5) {
                logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "METAKEY", c->name,
-                          c->hostname);
+                      c->hostname);
                return false;
        }
 
@@ -212,18 +248,26 @@ bool metakey_h(connection_t *c) {
 
        c->inkey = xrealloc(c->inkey, len);
 
-       if(!c->inctx)
-               c->inctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->inctx));
+       if(!c->inctx) {
+               c->inctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+
+               if(!c->inctx) {
+                       abort();
+               }
+       }
 
        /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
 
-       hex2bin(buffer, buffer, len);
+       if(!hex2bin(buffer, buffer, len)) {
+               logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s(%s): %s", "METAKEY", c->name, c->hostname, "invalid key");
+               return false;
+       }
 
        /* Decrypt the meta key */
 
-       if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, (unsigned char *)buffer, (unsigned char *)c->inkey, myself->connection->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) {  /* See challenge() */
-               logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during decryption of meta key for %s (%s)",
-                          c->name, c->hostname);
+       if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, (unsigned char *)buffer, (unsigned char *)c->inkey, myself->connection->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) {  /* See challenge() */
+               logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during decryption of meta key for %s (%s): %s",
+                      c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
                return false;
        }
 
@@ -239,21 +283,22 @@ bool metakey_h(connection_t *c) {
 
        if(cipher) {
                c->incipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher);
-               
+
                if(!c->incipher) {
                        logger(LOG_ERR, "%s (%s) uses unknown cipher!", c->name, c->hostname);
                        return false;
                }
 
                if(!EVP_DecryptInit(c->inctx, c->incipher,
-                                       (unsigned char *)c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len,
-                                       (unsigned char *)c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len -
-                                       c->incipher->iv_len)) {
+                                   (unsigned char *)c->inkey + len - EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c->incipher),
+                                   (unsigned char *)c->inkey + len - EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c->incipher) -
+                                   EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c->incipher))) {
                        logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of cipher from %s (%s): %s",
-                                       c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+                              c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
                        return false;
                }
 
+               c->inbudget = byte_budget(c->incipher);
                c->status.decryptin = true;
        } else {
                c->incipher = NULL;
@@ -269,7 +314,7 @@ bool metakey_h(connection_t *c) {
                        return false;
                }
 
-               if(c->inmaclength > c->indigest->md_size || c->inmaclength < 0) {
+               if(c->inmaclength > EVP_MD_size(c->indigest) || c->inmaclength < 0) {
                        logger(LOG_ERR, "%s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!", c->name, c->hostname);
                        return false;
                }
@@ -297,7 +342,11 @@ bool send_challenge(connection_t *c) {
 
        /* Copy random data to the buffer */
 
-       RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)c->hischallenge, len);
+       if(1 != RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)c->hischallenge, len)) {
+               int err = ERR_get_error();
+               logger(LOG_ERR, "Failed to generate challenge (%s)", ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
+               return false; // Do not send predictable challenges, let connection attempt fail.
+       }
 
        /* Convert to hex */
 
@@ -315,7 +364,7 @@ bool challenge_h(connection_t *c) {
 
        if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1) {
                logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHALLENGE", c->name,
-                          c->hostname);
+                      c->hostname);
                return false;
        }
 
@@ -325,7 +374,7 @@ bool challenge_h(connection_t *c) {
 
        if(strlen(buffer) != len * 2) {
                logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name,
-                          c->hostname, "wrong challenge length");
+                      c->hostname, "wrong challenge length");
                return false;
        }
 
@@ -335,7 +384,10 @@ bool challenge_h(connection_t *c) {
 
        /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
 
-       hex2bin(buffer, c->mychallenge, len);
+       if(!hex2bin(buffer, c->mychallenge, len)) {
+               logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s(%s): %s", "CHALLENGE", c->name, c->hostname, "invalid challenge");
+               return false;
+       }
 
        c->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY;
 
@@ -346,22 +398,31 @@ bool challenge_h(connection_t *c) {
 
 bool send_chal_reply(connection_t *c) {
        char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2 + 1];
-       EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+       EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
 
        /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we received */
 
-       if(!EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->indigest)
-                       || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->mychallenge, RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key))
-                       || !EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, (unsigned char *)hash, NULL)) {
+       ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+
+       if(!ctx) {
+               abort();
+       }
+
+       if(!EVP_DigestInit(ctx, c->indigest)
+                       || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, c->mychallenge, RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key))
+                       || !EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, (unsigned char *)hash, NULL)) {
+               EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
                logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during calculation of response for %s (%s): %s",
-                       c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+                      c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
                return false;
        }
 
+       EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
+
        /* Convert the hash to a hexadecimal formatted string */
 
-       bin2hex(hash, hash, c->indigest->md_size);
-       hash[c->indigest->md_size * 2] = '\0';
+       bin2hex(hash, hash, EVP_MD_size(c->indigest));
+       hash[EVP_MD_size(c->indigest) * 2] = '\0';
 
        /* Send the reply */
 
@@ -371,41 +432,53 @@ bool send_chal_reply(connection_t *c) {
 bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c) {
        char hishash[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
        char myhash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-       EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+       EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
 
        if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1) {
                logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHAL_REPLY", c->name,
-                          c->hostname);
+                      c->hostname);
                return false;
        }
 
        /* Check if the length of the hash is all right */
 
-       if(strlen(hishash) != c->outdigest->md_size * 2) {
+       if(strlen(hishash) != EVP_MD_size(c->outdigest) * 2) {
                logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name,
-                          c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply length");
+                      c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply length");
                return false;
        }
 
        /* Convert the hash to binary format */
 
-       hex2bin(hishash, hishash, c->outdigest->md_size);
+       if(!hex2bin(hishash, hishash, EVP_MD_size(c->outdigest))) {
+               logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s(%s): %s", "CHAL_REPLY", c->name, c->hostname, "invalid hash");
+               return false;
+       }
 
        /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we sent */
 
-       if(!EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->outdigest)
-                       || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->hischallenge, RSA_size(c->rsa_key))
-                       || !EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, (unsigned char *)myhash, NULL)) {
+       ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+
+       if(!ctx) {
+               abort();
+       }
+
+       if(!EVP_DigestInit(ctx, c->outdigest)
+                       || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, c->hischallenge, RSA_size(c->rsa_key))
+                       || !EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, (unsigned char *)myhash, NULL)) {
+               EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
                logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during calculation of response from %s (%s): %s",
-                       c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+                      c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
                return false;
        }
 
+       EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
+
        /* Verify the incoming hash with the calculated hash */
 
-       if(memcmp(hishash, myhash, c->outdigest->md_size)) {
+       if(memcmp(hishash, myhash, EVP_MD_size(c->outdigest))) {
                logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name,
-                          c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply");
+                      c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply");
 
                ifdebug(SCARY_THINGS) {
                        bin2hex(myhash, hishash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
@@ -439,19 +512,24 @@ bool send_ack(connection_t *c) {
 
        /* Check some options */
 
-       if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "IndirectData"), &choice) && choice) || myself->options & OPTION_INDIRECT)
+       if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "IndirectData"), &choice) && choice) || myself->options & OPTION_INDIRECT) {
                c->options |= OPTION_INDIRECT;
+       }
 
-       if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "TCPOnly"), &choice) && choice) || myself->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
+       if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "TCPOnly"), &choice) && choice) || myself->options & OPTION_TCPONLY) {
                c->options |= OPTION_TCPONLY | OPTION_INDIRECT;
+       }
 
-       if(myself->options & OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY)
+       if(myself->options & OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY && !(c->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)) {
                c->options |= OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY;
+       }
 
        choice = myself->options & OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
        get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "ClampMSS"), &choice);
-       if(choice)
+
+       if(choice) {
                c->options |= OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
+       }
 
        get_config_int(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "Weight"), &c->estimated_weight);
 
@@ -492,7 +570,6 @@ static void send_everything(connection_t *c) {
 
 bool ack_h(connection_t *c) {
        char hisport[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
-       char *hisaddress;
        int weight, mtu;
        uint32_t options;
        node_t *n;
@@ -500,7 +577,7 @@ bool ack_h(connection_t *c) {
 
        if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d %x", hisport, &weight, &options) != 3) {
                logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ACK", c->name,
-                          c->hostname);
+                      c->hostname);
                return false;
        }
 
@@ -516,7 +593,7 @@ bool ack_h(connection_t *c) {
                if(n->connection) {
                        /* Oh dear, we already have a connection to this node. */
                        ifdebug(CONNECTIONS) logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Established a second connection with %s (%s), closing old connection",
-                                          n->name, n->hostname);
+                                                   n->name, n->hostname);
                        terminate_connection(n->connection, false);
                        /* Run graph algorithm to purge key and make sure up/down scripts are rerun with new IP addresses and stuff */
                        graph();
@@ -525,23 +602,28 @@ bool ack_h(connection_t *c) {
 
        n->connection = c;
        c->node = n;
+
        if(!(c->options & options & OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY)) {
                c->options &= ~OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY;
                options &= ~OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY;
        }
+
        c->options |= options;
 
-       if(get_config_int(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "PMTU"), &mtu) && mtu < n->mtu)
+       if(get_config_int(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "PMTU"), &mtu) && mtu < n->mtu) {
                n->mtu = mtu;
+       }
 
-       if(get_config_int(lookup_config(config_tree, "PMTU"), &mtu) && mtu < n->mtu)
+       if(get_config_int(lookup_config(config_tree, "PMTU"), &mtu) && mtu < n->mtu) {
                n->mtu = mtu;
+       }
 
        if(get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "ClampMSS"), &choice)) {
-               if(choice)
+               if(choice) {
                        c->options |= OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
-               else
+               } else {
                        c->options &= ~OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
+               }
        }
 
        /* Activate this connection */
@@ -550,7 +632,7 @@ bool ack_h(connection_t *c) {
        c->status.active = true;
 
        ifdebug(CONNECTIONS) logger(LOG_NOTICE, "Connection with %s (%s) activated", c->name,
-                          c->hostname);
+                                   c->hostname);
 
        /* Send him everything we know */
 
@@ -561,9 +643,8 @@ bool ack_h(connection_t *c) {
        c->edge = new_edge();
        c->edge->from = myself;
        c->edge->to = n;
-       sockaddr2str(&c->address, &hisaddress, NULL);
-       c->edge->address = str2sockaddr(hisaddress, hisport);
-       free(hisaddress);
+       sockaddrcpy(&c->edge->address, &c->address);
+       sockaddr_setport(&c->edge->address, hisport);
        c->edge->weight = (weight + c->estimated_weight) / 2;
        c->edge->connection = c;
        c->edge->options = c->options;
@@ -572,10 +653,11 @@ bool ack_h(connection_t *c) {
 
        /* Notify everyone of the new edge */
 
-       if(tunnelserver)
+       if(tunnelserver) {
                send_add_edge(c, c->edge);
-       else
-               send_add_edge(broadcast, c->edge);
+       } else {
+               send_add_edge(everyone, c->edge);
+       }
 
        /* Run MST and SSSP algorithms */