/*
protocol_auth.c -- handle the meta-protocol, authentication
- Copyright (C) 1999-2003 Ivo Timmermans <ivo@o2w.nl>,
- 2000-2003 Guus Sliepen <guus@sliepen.eu.org>
+ Copyright (C) 1999-2005 Ivo Timmermans,
+ 2000-2009 Guus Sliepen <guus@tinc-vpn.org>
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
- $Id: protocol_auth.c,v 1.1.4.31 2003/12/20 19:47:52 guus Exp $
+ $Id$
*/
#include "system.h"
return false;
}
- /* If we set c->name in advance, make sure we are connected to the right host */
+ /* If this is an outgoing connection, make sure we are connected to the right host */
- if(c->name) {
+ if(c->outgoing) {
if(strcmp(c->name, name)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s is %s instead of %s"), c->hostname, name,
c->name);
return false;
}
- } else
+ } else {
+ if(c->name)
+ free(c->name);
c->name = xstrdup(name);
+ }
/* Check if version matches */
bool send_metakey(connection_t *c)
{
- char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
+ char *buffer;
int len;
bool x;
/* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
- if(!c->outkey)
- c->outkey = xmalloc(len);
+ buffer = alloca(2 * len + 1);
+
+ c->outkey = xrealloc(c->outkey, len);
if(!c->outctx)
c->outctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->outctx));
cp();
/* Copy random data to the buffer */
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(c->outkey, len);
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)c->outkey, len);
/* The message we send must be smaller than the modulus of the RSA key.
By definition, for a key of k bits, the following formula holds:
with a length equal to that of the modulus of the RSA key.
*/
- if(RSA_public_encrypt(len, c->outkey, buffer, c->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) {
+ if(RSA_public_encrypt(len, (unsigned char *)c->outkey, (unsigned char *)buffer, c->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) {
logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"),
c->name, c->hostname);
return false;
if(c->outcipher) {
if(!EVP_EncryptInit(c->outctx, c->outcipher,
- c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len,
- c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len -
+ (unsigned char *)c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len,
+ (unsigned char *)c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len -
c->outcipher->iv_len)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during initialisation of cipher for %s (%s): %s"),
c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
/* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
- if(!c->inkey)
- c->inkey = xmalloc(len);
+ c->inkey = xrealloc(c->inkey, len);
if(!c->inctx)
c->inctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->inctx));
/* Decrypt the meta key */
- if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, buffer, c->inkey, myself->connection->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) { /* See challenge() */
- logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"),
+ if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, (unsigned char *)buffer, (unsigned char *)c->inkey, myself->connection->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) { /* See challenge() */
+ logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during decryption of meta key for %s (%s)"),
c->name, c->hostname);
return false;
}
}
if(!EVP_DecryptInit(c->inctx, c->incipher,
- c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len,
- c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len -
+ (unsigned char *)c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len,
+ (unsigned char *)c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len -
c->incipher->iv_len)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during initialisation of cipher from %s (%s): %s"),
c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
bool send_challenge(connection_t *c)
{
- char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
+ char *buffer;
int len;
cp();
/* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
- if(!c->hischallenge)
- c->hischallenge = xmalloc(len);
+ buffer = alloca(2 * len + 1);
+
+ c->hischallenge = xrealloc(c->hischallenge, len);
/* Copy random data to the buffer */
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(c->hischallenge, len);
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)c->hischallenge, len);
/* Convert to hex */
/* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
- if(!c->mychallenge)
- c->mychallenge = xmalloc(len);
+ c->mychallenge = xrealloc(c->mychallenge, len);
/* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
if(!EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->indigest)
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->mychallenge, RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key))
- || !EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, hash, NULL)) {
+ || !EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, (unsigned char *)hash, NULL)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during calculation of response for %s (%s): %s"),
c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return false;
if(!EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->outdigest)
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->hischallenge, RSA_size(c->rsa_key))
- || !EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, myhash, NULL)) {
+ || !EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, (unsigned char *)myhash, NULL)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during calculation of response from %s (%s): %s"),
c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return false;
if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "TCPOnly"), &choice) && choice) || myself->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
c->options |= OPTION_TCPONLY | OPTION_INDIRECT;
- if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "DontFragment"), &choice) && choice) || myself->options & OPTION_DONTFRAGMENT)
- c->options |= OPTION_DONTFRAGMENT;
+ if(myself->options & OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY)
+ c->options |= OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY;
+
+ get_config_int(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "Weight"), &c->estimated_weight);
return send_request(c, "%d %s %d %lx", ACK, myport, c->estimated_weight, c->options);
}
{
char hisport[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
char *hisaddress, *dummy;
- int weight;
+ int weight, mtu;
long int options;
node_t *n;
n->connection = c;
c->node = n;
+ if(!(c->options & options & OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY)) {
+ c->options &= ~OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY;
+ options &= ~OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY;
+ }
c->options |= options;
+ if(get_config_int(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "PMTU"), &mtu) && mtu < n->mtu)
+ n->mtu = mtu;
+
+ if(get_config_int(lookup_config(myself->connection->config_tree, "PMTU"), &mtu) && mtu < n->mtu)
+ n->mtu = mtu;
+
/* Activate this connection */
c->allow_request = ALL;
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