2 protocol_auth.c -- handle the meta-protocol, authentication
3 Copyright (C) 1999-2002 Ivo Timmermans <ivo@o2w.nl>,
4 2000-2002 Guus Sliepen <guus@sliepen.eu.org>
6 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
7 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
8 the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
9 (at your option) any later version.
11 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
12 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
14 GNU General Public License for more details.
16 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
17 along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
18 Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
20 $Id: protocol_auth.c,v 1.1.4.22 2003/07/06 23:16:29 guus Exp $
35 #include <openssl/sha.h>
36 #include <openssl/rand.h>
37 #include <openssl/evp.h>
44 #include "connection.h"
52 int send_id(connection_t *c)
56 return send_request(c, "%d %s %d", ID, myself->connection->name,
57 myself->connection->protocol_version);
60 int id_h(connection_t *c)
62 char name[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
67 if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d", name, &c->protocol_version) != 2) {
68 logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "ID", c->name,
73 /* Check if identity is a valid name */
76 logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s): %s"), "ID", c->name,
77 c->hostname, "invalid name");
81 /* If we set c->name in advance, make sure we are connected to the right host */
84 if(strcmp(c->name, name)) {
85 logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s is %s instead of %s"), c->hostname, name,
90 c->name = xstrdup(name);
92 /* Check if version matches */
94 if(c->protocol_version != myself->connection->protocol_version) {
95 logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s (%s) uses incompatible version %d"),
96 c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_version);
100 if(bypass_security) {
102 init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
103 c->allow_request = ACK;
107 if(!c->config_tree) {
108 init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
110 bla = read_connection_config(c);
113 logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s had unknown identity (%s)"), c->hostname,
119 if(read_rsa_public_key(c)) {
123 /* Check some options */
125 if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "IndirectData"), &bla) && bla) || myself->options & OPTION_INDIRECT)
126 c->options |= OPTION_INDIRECT;
128 if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "TCPOnly"), &bla) && bla) || myself->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
129 c->options |= OPTION_TCPONLY | OPTION_INDIRECT;
131 c->allow_request = METAKEY;
133 return send_metakey(c);
136 int send_metakey(connection_t *c)
138 char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
143 len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
145 /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
148 c->outkey = xmalloc(len);
151 c->outctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->outctx));
153 /* Copy random data to the buffer */
155 RAND_bytes(c->outkey, len);
157 /* The message we send must be smaller than the modulus of the RSA key.
158 By definition, for a key of k bits, the following formula holds:
160 2^(k-1) <= modulus < 2^(k)
162 Where ^ means "to the power of", not "xor".
163 This means that to be sure, we must choose our message < 2^(k-1).
164 This can be done by setting the most significant bit to zero.
167 c->outkey[0] &= 0x7F;
169 if(debug_level >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) {
170 bin2hex(c->outkey, buffer, len);
171 buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
172 logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_DEBUG, _("Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s"),
176 /* Encrypt the random data
178 We do not use one of the PKCS padding schemes here.
179 This is allowed, because we encrypt a totally random string
180 with a length equal to that of the modulus of the RSA key.
183 if(RSA_public_encrypt(len, c->outkey, buffer, c->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) {
184 logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"),
185 c->name, c->hostname);
189 /* Convert the encrypted random data to a hexadecimal formatted string */
191 bin2hex(buffer, buffer, len);
192 buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
194 /* Send the meta key */
196 x = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY,
197 c->outcipher ? c->outcipher->nid : 0,
198 c->outdigest ? c->outdigest->type : 0, c->outmaclength,
199 c->outcompression, buffer);
201 /* Further outgoing requests are encrypted with the key we just generated */
204 EVP_EncryptInit(c->outctx, c->outcipher,
205 c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len,
206 c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len -
207 c->outcipher->iv_len);
209 c->status.encryptout = 1;
215 int metakey_h(connection_t *c)
217 char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
218 int cipher, digest, maclength, compression;
223 if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d %d %d %d %d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, buffer) != 5) {
224 logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "METAKEY", c->name,
229 len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
231 /* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */
233 if(strlen(buffer) != len * 2) {
234 logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
238 /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
241 c->inkey = xmalloc(len);
244 c->inctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->inctx));
246 /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
248 hex2bin(buffer, buffer, len);
250 /* Decrypt the meta key */
252 if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, buffer, c->inkey, myself->connection->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) { /* See challenge() */
253 logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"),
254 c->name, c->hostname);
258 if(debug_level >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) {
259 bin2hex(c->inkey, buffer, len);
260 buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
261 logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_DEBUG, _("Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s"), buffer);
264 /* All incoming requests will now be encrypted. */
266 /* Check and lookup cipher and digest algorithms */
269 c->incipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher);
272 logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses unknown cipher!"), c->name, c->hostname);
276 EVP_DecryptInit(c->inctx, c->incipher,
277 c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len,
278 c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len -
279 c->incipher->iv_len);
281 c->status.decryptin = 1;
286 c->inmaclength = maclength;
289 c->indigest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest);
292 logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, _("Node %s (%s) uses unknown digest!"), c->name, c->hostname);
296 if(c->inmaclength > c->indigest->md_size || c->inmaclength < 0) {
297 logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!"), c->name, c->hostname);
304 c->incompression = compression;
306 c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
308 return send_challenge(c);
311 int send_challenge(connection_t *c)
313 char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
318 /* CHECKME: what is most reasonable value for len? */
320 len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
322 /* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
325 c->hischallenge = xmalloc(len);
327 /* Copy random data to the buffer */
329 RAND_bytes(c->hischallenge, len);
333 bin2hex(c->hischallenge, buffer, len);
334 buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
336 /* Send the challenge */
338 x = send_request(c, "%d %s", CHALLENGE, buffer);
343 int challenge_h(connection_t *c)
345 char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
350 if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1) {
351 logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "CHALLENGE", c->name,
356 len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
358 /* Check if the length of the challenge is all right */
360 if(strlen(buffer) != len * 2) {
361 logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name,
362 c->hostname, "wrong challenge length");
366 /* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
369 c->mychallenge = xmalloc(len);
371 /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
373 hex2bin(buffer, c->mychallenge, len);
375 c->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY;
377 /* Rest is done by send_chal_reply() */
379 return send_chal_reply(c);
382 int send_chal_reply(connection_t *c)
384 char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2 + 1];
389 /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we received */
391 EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->indigest);
392 EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->mychallenge,
393 RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key));
394 EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, hash, NULL);
396 /* Convert the hash to a hexadecimal formatted string */
398 bin2hex(hash, hash, c->indigest->md_size);
399 hash[c->indigest->md_size * 2] = '\0';
403 return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, hash);
406 int chal_reply_h(connection_t *c)
408 char hishash[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
409 char myhash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
414 if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1) {
415 logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "CHAL_REPLY", c->name,
420 /* Check if the length of the hash is all right */
422 if(strlen(hishash) != c->outdigest->md_size * 2) {
423 logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name,
424 c->hostname, _("wrong challenge reply length"));
428 /* Convert the hash to binary format */
430 hex2bin(hishash, hishash, c->outdigest->md_size);
432 /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we sent */
434 EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->outdigest);
435 EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->hischallenge, RSA_size(c->rsa_key));
436 EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, myhash, NULL);
438 /* Verify the incoming hash with the calculated hash */
440 if(memcmp(hishash, myhash, c->outdigest->md_size)) {
441 logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name,
442 c->hostname, _("wrong challenge reply"));
444 if(debug_level >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) {
445 bin2hex(myhash, hishash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
446 hishash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2] = '\0';
447 logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_DEBUG, _("Expected challenge reply: %s"), hishash);
453 /* Identity has now been positively verified.
454 Send an acknowledgement with the rest of the information needed.
457 c->allow_request = ACK;
462 int send_ack(connection_t *c)
464 /* ACK message contains rest of the information the other end needs
465 to create node_t and edge_t structures. */
472 /* Estimate weight */
474 gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
475 c->estimated_weight =
476 (now.tv_sec - c->start.tv_sec) * 1000 + (now.tv_usec -
477 c->start.tv_usec) / 1000;
478 x = send_request(c, "%d %s %d %lx", ACK, myport, c->estimated_weight,
484 static void send_everything(connection_t *c)
486 avl_node_t *node, *node2;
491 /* Send all known subnets and edges */
493 for(node = node_tree->head; node; node = node->next) {
494 n = (node_t *) node->data;
496 for(node2 = n->subnet_tree->head; node2; node2 = node2->next) {
497 s = (subnet_t *) node2->data;
498 send_add_subnet(c, s);
501 for(node2 = n->edge_tree->head; node2; node2 = node2->next) {
502 e = (edge_t *) node2->data;
508 int ack_h(connection_t *c)
510 char hisport[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
511 char *hisaddress, *dummy;
518 if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d %lx", hisport, &weight, &options) != 3) {
519 logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "ACK", c->name,
524 /* Check if we already have a node_t for him */
526 n = lookup_node(c->name);
530 n->name = xstrdup(c->name);
534 /* Oh dear, we already have a connection to this node. */
535 logger(DEBUG_CONNECTIONS, LOG_DEBUG, _("Established a second connection with %s (%s), closing old connection"),
536 n->name, n->hostname);
537 terminate_connection(n->connection, 0);
538 /* Run graph algorithm to purge key and make sure up/down scripts are rerun with new IP addresses and stuff */
545 c->options |= options;
547 /* Activate this connection */
549 c->allow_request = ALL;
550 c->status.active = 1;
552 logger(DEBUG_CONNECTIONS, LOG_NOTICE, _("Connection with %s (%s) activated"), c->name,
555 /* Send him everything we know */
559 /* Create an edge_t for this connection */
561 c->edge = new_edge();
563 c->edge->from = myself;
565 sockaddr2str(&c->address, &hisaddress, &dummy);
566 c->edge->address = str2sockaddr(hisaddress, hisport);
569 c->edge->weight = (weight + c->estimated_weight) / 2;
570 c->edge->connection = c;
571 c->edge->options = c->options;
575 /* Notify everyone of the new edge */
577 send_add_edge(broadcast, c->edge);
579 /* Run MST and SSSP algorithms */